

Stefan Mitsch, Sarah M. Loos, and André Platzer


Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University

## CASE STUDIES


### Aircraft Controllers [1]:

As airspace becomes ever more crowded, air traffic management must reduce both space and time between aircraft to increase throughput, making on-board collision avoidance systems ever more important. We prove the collision avoidance systems never allow aircraft to get too close to one another, even when new planes approach an in-progress avoidance maneuver.

#### Aircraft Big Disc Protocol




#### Aircraft Small Discs Protocol




**Robot Obstacle Avoidance [2]:** Nowadays, robots interact frequently with a dynamic environment outside limited manufacturing sites and in close proximity with humans. Thus, safety of motion and obstacle avoidance are vital safety features of such robots. We formally verify that our controller avoids both stationary and moving obstacles.

#### Robot Obstacle Avoidance: Passive Safety




**Train Control [3]:** We prove that the European Train Control System protocol remains correct even in the presence of perturbation by disturbances in the dynamics and when a PI controlled speed supervision is used.

## Hybrid Dynamics




**Adaptive Cruise Control, Road Traffic Control [4,5]:** Car safety measures can be most effective when the cars on a street coordinate their control actions to minimize the risk of safety hazards and collisions. We verify that the control models guarantee collision freedom for arbitrarily many cars on a street, even if new cars enter from on-ramps or multi-lane streets.

#### Adaptive Cruise Control and Road Traffic Control




**Robotic Surgery [6]:** We analyzed a control algorithm that provides directional force feedback for a surgical robot. We found two bugs and described exactly what could go wrong. We then developed a new algorithm that provides safe operation along with directional force feedback. We created a machine-checked proof that guarantees the new algorithm is safe for all inputs.

#### Robotic Surgery



## METHOD


Automotive, aircraft, railway, and robotics controllers are hybrid systems, which we model and verify using differential dynamic logic (dL) [7,8]. Below are a few selected rules from the dL proof calculus.




The basic operators are (non-deterministic) assignment ( $x := f(x)$ ,  $x := *$ ), non-deterministic choice ( $\alpha \cup \beta$ ), sequential composition ( $\alpha; \beta$ ), and non-deterministic repetition ( $\alpha^*$ ). dL formulae are built with expressions over the reals using the usual logical connectives, quantifiers, and modality operators.

## TOOLS

KeYmaera [9] is our automated theorem-prover for differential dynamic logic. KeYmaera supports hybrid systems with nonlinear discrete jumps, non-linear differential equations, differential-algebraic equations, differential inequalities, and systems with nondeterministic discrete or continuous input. KeYmaera implements proof strategies that decompose hybrid systems symbolically and prove the full system by proving properties of its parts.



Sɔnx [10] is our model-based design tool for hybrid systems. It provides a graphical and textual editor for differential dynamic logic. Sɔnx links to KeYmaera, exchanges models and full or partial proofs, and supports C code generation.



## HOW CAN I APPLY THE METHODS?

Our formal verification methods use a hybrid system model that specifies both its discrete and continuous behavior. This tends to be easier if the original specification already models physics (e.g., differential equations for robot kinematics). In addition, the safety condition(s) that must be met by the system must be formally specified. Sometimes, these are obvious (e.g., distance to static obstacles always non-zero), in other cases the process of finding a safety condition already provides value in itself (e.g., who is to blame for a collision of two moving agents?).

## REFERENCES

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